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Let's pause here and note what this moment
represented. For the first time, the [Federal Open
Market] Committee was using communication-mere
words-as its primary monetary policy tool. Until
then, it was probably common to think of
communication about future policy as something that
supplemented the setting of the federal funds rate. In
this case, communication was an independent and
effective tool for influencing the economy. The FOMC
had journeyed from "never explain" to a point where
sometimes the explanation is the policy.
- Janet L. Yellen'
In late 2008, as the full impact the Global Financial Crisis would
have on the United States economy remained painfully unclear, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System faced a difficult
dilemma. The economy was continuing to contract at a dizzying
pace. 2 The already dramatic growth in unemployment showed no
3
sign of abating-and looked like it might well be accelerating. Yet
the Fed's primary-if not exclusive-tool for intervention was no
longer available to it. The Fed had already reduced its target for
the federal funds rate to zero,4and further opportunity for monetary
stimulus seemed out of reach.
Rather than resigning itself to whatever fiscal stimulus might
be generated by the particularly chaotic dynamics of the political
branches at that moment, however, the Fed turned to the
experience of other central banks facing similar circumstances.
Moving beyond its traditional reliance on short-term interest rate
1 Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
Society of American Business Editors and Writers 50th Anniversary Conference:
Communication in Monetary Policy 8-9 (Apr. 4, 2013), available at http://www.federalreser
ve.gov/news events/speechlyelen20l30404a.htm.
2 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the

Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce: Federal Reserve Policies in the Financial Crisis (Dec.
1, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechlbernanke2008l2Ola.htm
(commenting on the economic decline in 2008).
3

Id.

4

Yellen, supranote 1, at 9.
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adjustments alone, the Fed embraced two important new tools of
monetary policy.
The first-the Federal Reserve Board's purchase of a massive
volume of Treasury and mortgage-backed debt-received
substantial public attention. "Quantitative easing," by which the
Fed took on debt obligations equivalent in size to the German
economy, was the subject of significant controversy.5 Over its
three rounds, however, it appears to have done significant work in
helping to stall the economy's downward slide, and eventually to
6
turn that tide.
In this brief Article, I explore the Fed's other tool of monetary
policy, which has received far less attention but may be no less
important, both as a tool of monetary policy and as a window into
the growing complexity of administrative agency interventions in
the modern economy. That the Fed's second new tool of monetary
policy received less attention should perhaps come as no surprise,
however, given its nature as nothing more than talk.
Alongside its absorption of a mind-boggling amount of debt the
Fed found significant utility in changing its approach to
communicating its monetary policy plans. 7 More specifically, in
more effectively communicating both its decisionmaking
framework for setting short-term rate targets and its expectations
for what adjustments might result over the medium term, the Fed
concluded it could move long-term interest rates in ways that it
could not otherwise accomplish and that might be essential to the
8
economy's recovery.
From this significant change in the Federal Reserve Board's
communication policy and practice, this Article suggests, we may
5 Jeff Kearns, The Fed Eases Off, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.blo
ombergview.com/quicktake/federal-reserve-quantitative-easing-tape.
6 See JOHN C. WILLIAMS, HUTCHINS CTR. ON FISCAL & MONETARY POLICY, MONETARY
POLICY AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: PUI7NG THEORY INTO PRACTICE 10-11 (2014), available
at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/researchfiles/papers2014lo0/16%20monetary%20policy
%20zero%201ower%20bound/16%20monetary%2Opolicy%20zero%20lower%20bound%20willia
ms.pdf (discussing research findings regarding the economic effects of asset purchases by
Federal Reserve).
7 Yellen, supra note 1.
8 See id. ("[Tihe federal funds rate [can] fulfill an important 'automatic stabilizer'
function of the economy.").
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gain insight into what we should understand to constitute
"regulatory action" by administrative agencies. While far from the
type of coercive constraint that regulatory agencies commonly
impose, the Fed's systematic use of communication as a tool in the
pursuit of its statutory mandate might be understood to have
something of a regulatory quality to it. Talk may be cheap. But
might it also be a kind of regulation?
In what follows, I begin by outlining the traditional theory and
practice of central bank (non-)communication, as well as the
Federal Reserve Board's halting movement away from that
approach, prior to the global financial crisis. Part II reviews the
Fed's initial-and insufficient-response to crisis, setting the stage
for its embrace of communication as a critical new tool of monetary
policy, as described in Part III. Part IV explores the potential
lessons that administrative law might learn from the Fed's turn to
communication as a policy tool. In succession, it questions three
potential critiques of the treatment of Fed communications as a
species of regulation-given the true nature, function, and impact
of those communications. Based on the foregoing, it posits the selfevidently perplexing possibility that administrative law should
embrace some form of regulatory review of Federal Reserve Board
(and analogous) agency communications.
I. THE THEORY AND TRADITIONAL PRACTICE OF CENTRAL BANK
COMMUNICATION
In the traditional practice of financial regulation, "central bank
External
communication" was something of an oxymoron.
communication-and public engagement generally-were simply
not within the job description of a central banker. 9 Particularly in
central banks' task of setting monetary policy, communication was
considered irrelevant. 10

9 See Alan S. Blinder et al., What We Know and What We Would Like to Know About
Central Bank Communication, VOX (May 15, 2008), http://www.voxeu.org/article/central-ba
nk-communication ("[C]onventional wisdom in central banking circles held that monetary
policymakers should say as little as possible and say it cryptically.").
10 Id.
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In fact, mere disregard may be too generous a characterization
of central banks' traditional relationship with communication. For
many central bankers, external communication was understood to
conflict with effective monetary policy.)
In maximizing the
efficacy of central bank policymaking, secrecy was the goal. 12 As
succinctly put by Montagu Norman, the influential former
governor of the Bank of England, "never explain, never excuse." 13
At the extreme, the standard practice of many central banks
was to include no announcement whatsoever of their policy
decisions. 14 Instead, the bank would simply adjust their lending or
purchasing activity-including the relevant interest rate--without
prior or even contemporaneous notice. 15 Commercial banks would

11See id. (noting controversy over what constitutes an optimal communication strategy
for central banks). The perceived difficulties associated with central bank communication
included the possibility (or mere perception) that some might be better able to take
advantage of relevant disclosures, the risk of market over-reaction, and the potential to
limit a central bank's discretion in the future, even in the face of changed circumstances.
See generally Yellen, supra note 1 (discussing justifications for central banks withholding
information about monetary policy decisions). Alan Greenspan succinctly captured the
latter concern: "[A] public announcement requirement [for reserves or interest rates] could
impede timely and appropriate adjustments to policy." Zero Inflation: Hearingon H.J.Res.
409 Before the H. Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy, H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. &
Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 50 (1989) (prepared Statement of Alan Greenspan, Chair, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
12
Central bankers long believed that a certain "mystique" attached to their
activities; that making monetary policy was an arcane and esoteric art that
should be left solely to the initiates; and that letting the public into the
discussion would only usurp the prerogatives of insiders and degrade the
effectiveness of policy.
Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Meetings of the American
Economics Association: Fedspeak (Jan. 3, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
Boarddocs/Speeches/2004200401032/default.htm.
See also Michael Woodford, Central Bank
Communication and Policy Effectiveness 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 11898, 2005) ('The mystique" of central banking was 'Jealously guarded by central
bankers ....).
13 Bernanke, supra note 12 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
14 See Sakari Suoninen, Analysis: Forward Guidance More Than Passing Fashion for
Central Banks, REUTERS (July 11, 2013, 10:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07
/11/us-centralbanks-forwardguidance-analysis-idUSBRE96AODY20130711 (discussing the
evolution of central banks' information policies and the costs and benefits of providing
increased information).
15See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER ET AL., INTL CTR.FOR MONETARY & BANKING STUDIES, How
Do CENTRAL BANKS TALK? 67 (2001) (noting past Fed practice of entering money market
unannounced, except for symbolic discount rate changes).
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learn of the policy change only when they sought to initiate
16
transactions with the central bank.
Alan Greenspan, former Chair of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, turned this commitment to opacity into a
high art. During his tenure as Chair, the telecommunications
revolution would make a complete avoidance of public engagement
increasingly difficult to sustain. 17 Post-Watergate expectations of
congressional oversight-and government disclosure-likely had
similar effects, hence Greenspan's perfection of what came to be
8
known-with no little fondness-as "Fedspeak."'
Greenspan dutifully embraced his obligation to speak to the
Federal Reserve Board's perspective on the United States and
global economy, and on the equilibrium of inflation and job growth
that the Fed was charged to achieve. 19 But in his use of technical
terminology and seemingly contradictory characterizations of the
state of the economy and the Fed's views of it-all offered within
sentences of almost interminable length-Greenspan perfected the
art of speaking regularly, while communicating little. 20 In some
cases, he effectively left his audience less informed than before he
21
spoke.

16

See id. (noting that "Fed watchers" would have to discern the central banks financial

strategy indirectly).
17 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 3 (relating the "modest" response of the FOMC to the
growing speed and frequency of most communication).
18 See Bill Mintz, Greenspan Makes It Perfectly Obscure, HOUS. CHRON. (June 22, 1995),
http://www.nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we-Archives?p-action=print&p-docid=OE7B485A20
49AF3.
19 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining that pursuit of full employment and
moderated inflation constitutes the "dual mandate" of the Federal Reserve Board).
20 See Bill Barnhart, Fedspeak's New Nuances, CHI. TRIB. (May 18, 2007), available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-05-18(business/0705171115-1 greenspan-and-bernan
ke-ben-bernanke-monetary-policy (commenting on Alan Greenspan's "opaque answers to
straightforward questions," which Greenspan said resulted from a "syntax collapse"); Daily
Chart: Fedspeak, ECONOMIST (Nov. 11, 2014, 2:01 PM), http://www.economist.com/node/21632
021/print (charting comments by the FOMC that became "longer and more complex' over
time, forming a kind of "doublespeak" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21 One is reminded of Justice Jackson's famous lamentation in dissent: "I give up. Now I
realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The more you explain it, the more I
don't understand it."' Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Amongst innumerable examples, Greenspan's 2005 testimony to
the House Financial Services Committee is suggestive: "[R]isk
takers have been encouraged by a perceived increase in economic
stability to reach out to more distant time horizons... [but] long
periods of relative stability often engender unrealistic expectations
of its permanence and, at times, may lead to financial excess and
economic stress."22 To similarly obtuse effect was his statement to
the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee in
2001: "The members of the Board of Governors and the Reserve
Bank presidents foresee an implicit strengthening of activity after
the current rebalancing is over, although the central tendency of
a substantial
their individual forecasts for real GDP still shows
23
slowdown, on balance, for the year as a whole."
Such verbiage cannot be ascribed to any innate incapacity to
communicate, or even an inattention to clarity or syntax on
Greenspan's part. To the contrary, as Greenspan acknowledged on
more than one occasion, his Fedspeak was a product of intelligent
design. 24 Responding to a United States senator who claimed to
have understood the point Greenspan had just made, he made that
fact quite clear: "[I]n that case," he explained, "I must have
2
misspoken." 5
22 Federal Reserve's Second Monetary Policy Report for 2005: Hearing on Oversight on the
Monetary Policy Report to Congress Pursuantto the Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act of 1978 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & UrbanAffairs, 109th Cong. 34 (2005)
(prepared Statement of Alan Greenspan, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
23 Oversight on the Monetary Policy Report to Congress Pursuant to the Full Employment
and Balanced Growth Act of 1978: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. &
UrbanAffairs, 107th Cong. 57 (2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
hh2001/February/Testimony.htm.
24 In Greenspan's own words:
It's... a language of purposeful obfuscation to avoid certain questions
coming up, which you know you can't answer, and saying... "I will not
answer or basically no comment is, in fact, an answer." So, I proceed with
four or five sentences which get increasingly obscure. The Congressman
thinks I answered the question and goes onto the next one.

Jennifer Dauble, Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan Speaks Extensively to Maria
Bartiroma, CNBC (Sept. 17, 2007, 10:06 AM) (quoting an Interview by Maria Bartiromo,
CNBC, with Alan Greenspan, former Chair of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys.), http://www.cnbc.com/id/20819918.
25 BLINDER ET AL., supra note 15, at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Heather
Stewart, After Greenspan,the Deluge?, THE GuARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2005, 9:28 PM), http://www.th
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For all its charms, however, Alan Greenspan's commitment to
ineffective communication was not embraced by all of his peers on
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Beginning in the
1990s, other members of the Board began to encourage
enhancement of both the quality and quantity of Fed
communication. 26 Over time, even Greenspan himself came to
27
support movement in that direction.
In February 1994-even if only in the face of some external
pressure-the Fed for the first time issued a formal announcement
of a rate change decision. 28 Within a year, it made that practice
official policy. 29 Starting in 1999, the Fed supplemented those
announcements with an explanatory statement as to its decisionmoving away from its prior practice of terse and generic
statements offering little (if any) insight as to the basis for the
Fed's decision. 30 Notably, the new practice extended even to
31
meetings at which no change was made.
Beginning with its May 1999 meeting, the Fed also changed its
practice regarding any "bias" in its policy stance-its relative
concern with inflationary pressures versus economic growth (and
job growth in particular). 32 Whereas any bias of the Fed, in the

eguardian.combusiness2005/oct30/useconomy.usnews
("Greenspan ... telling a Senate
committee in 1987, 'since becoming a central banker, I have learn[ed] to mumble with great
incoherence. If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.' ").
26 See Woodford, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing FOMC's increased transparency over the
past fifteen years).
27 See, e.g., BLINDER ET AL., supra note 15, at 67 ("Greenspan immediately announced the
FOMC's February 1994 decision to raise interest rates.").
28 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 5 ("It wasn't until February 1994 that the Committee
issued a postmeeting statement disclosing a change in monetary policy.").
29 See BLINDER ET AL., supra note 15, at 67 ("[I]n February 1995, the FOMC adopted the
policy of immediate announcement of policy changes.").
30 See id. ("Until 1999, the FOMC made only brief, and often cryptic explanations when it
changed policy ... ").
31 See id. at 67-68 (explaining the evolution of the FOMC's decision to offer an
"explanatory statement after each meeting (or at least most of them), even when the
decision was to leave rates alone").
32 See id. at 68 ('In May 1999, [the FOMC] started announcing the bias immediately after
each meeting ... ").
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guise of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), 33 at a given
meeting had previously only been announced following its
subsequent meeting, it now adopted the practice of offering it
immediately, thereby providing forward-oriented guidance to the
market. 34 In 2000, the FOMC went yet further, for the first time
acknowledging the potential extension of its bias beyond the
35
immediately following meeting.
Following the bursting of the information technology bubble
and the accounting frauds that brought down Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, and other blue chip firms in 2001, the Fed formalized this
practice of offering guidance on the expected path of interest rates
in the future. 36 With the federal funds rate already reduced to the
then-historically low level of 1%, such guidance was seen as a
37 After only two
potential tool to stimulate weak capital markets.
38
abandoned.
years, however, that practice was
Following his appointment as Chair of the Board of Governors in
2006, Ben Bernanke accelerated the movement away from the
practice of Fedspeak-and beyond the tradition of minimal central
To begin, he implemented further
bank communication.

33 'The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is the monetary policymaking body of
the Federal Reserve System." Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12844.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
34 BLINDER ET AL., supra note 15, at 67-68.
35 See id. at 68 (noting that the Fed reports its bias as applicable to "the foreseeable
future" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Yellen, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that
the FOMC noted "whether it was leaning toward increasing or decreasing the federal funds
rate in the future").
36 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 8 ('The trend toward greater transparency [from the
FOMC] accelerated during the early 2000s.. . [and] information about intentions and
expectations for the future, known as forward guidance, became crucial in 2003, when the
Committee was faced with a stubbornly weak recovery from the 2001 recession."); see also
Jay G. Stirling, How to Deal with Hornets: The Administrative ProcedureAct and the Social
Cost of Carbon, 100 IOWA L. REV. 853, 870 (2015) (noting that the Fed first began to
announce its "intentions and expectations" for the federal funds rate in early 2000s).
37 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing how the information was meant to "stimulate
the economy").
38 Silvio Contessi & Li Li, Forward Guidance 101A_" A Roadmap of the U.S. Experience,
FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis ECON. SYNOPSES, Sept. 2013, at 2, https://www.research.stlou
is.fed.org/publications/es/13/ES-25-2013-09-10.pdf.
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improvements in the processes surrounding Fed communications. 39
Rather than waiting until after the following meeting to release
FOMC minutes, as had previously been the practice, the minutes
were released soon after the meeting had occurred. 40 While still not
immediate, that accelerated release transformed any insight
contained in the minutes into market-relevant information.41
"[M]ore explicit statements about the likely future path of
interest rates" further enhanced the clarity of FOMC post-meeting
statements. 42 And those statements came to be the subject of
43
significant market attention.
Bernanke also initiated a practice of holding regular press
conferences and otherwise responding to press inquiries, which in
the past had occurred infrequently at best. 44 Finally, a variety of
efforts to integrate the views of multiple Board members into an
overall statement of the Fed's views and expectations were also
undertaken. 45
II. RESPONDING TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Even with the perspective of time, the scope-and impact--of
the financial crisis that struck the global economy in 2007 is not
easy to capture. Already by 2010, before the full impact of the
39See, e.g., Yellen, supra note 1, at 1 (noting Chairman Bernanke's practices of conducting
post-FOMC committee meeting press conferences and providing "detailed minutes of the
[FOMC's] meetings").
40 See Woodford, supra note 12, at 1 (commenting on the growing transparency of FOMC
policy, through the public availability of minutes of its deliberations, prior to the next
meeting).
41 See id. ("Since August 2003 ... post-meeting statements have included even more
explicit statements about the likely future path of interest rates.. .[, which] attracts
considerable attention, in financial markets and in the financial press.").
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 4 (commenting on the evolution of Fed communication,
including the introduction of post-meeting press conferences); cf. Charles I. Plosser, Fed
Policy: Good Intentions, Risky Consequences, 33 CATo J. 347, 353 (2013) ('The [Fed]
chairman.., holds press conferences following each of the meetings at which the SEPs are
compiled.").
45 See David Zaring, Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee, 78 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 164 (2015) (discussing Alan Greenspan's encouragement of
unanimity in Fed policy directives).
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crisis had been felt, characterizations of some dramatic flair were
entirely in order:
The global financial crisis has been characterized by
an unexpected collapse of asset values; extreme
uncertainty, fear, and pessimism about future asset
values; a severe contraction of credit and risk-taking;
rising unemployment; and a shrinkage in general
economic output. Hundreds of banks have failed or
been bailed out, and hundreds more will fail before the
crisis is over. Trillions of dollars of asset values have
been wiped out. Fortunes have been lost. Some
families have lost their homes. Unemployment has
soared. Ponzi schemes have been46exposed. Economic
output has slowed or even shrunk.
By the time all was said and done, however, even the most overthe-top characterizations turned out to be understatements.
As of 2013, growth in the United States gross domestic product
was set back by four years-with a full recovery not expected until
2017.4 7

The unemployment rate in the United States more than

Residential and non-residential investment declined by
50
$400 billion each, 49 while housing prices fell by nearly a third.

doubled. 48

46 Randall D. Guynn, The Global FinancialCrisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform, 2010
B.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 422-23.
47 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2013 TO

2023, at 4 (2013), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43907.
48 See Civilian Unemployment Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (updated Sept.
4, 2015, 11:02 AM), https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/UNRATE (graphing an
unemployment rate of 4.4% in March 2007 and 10% in October 2009).
49 See National Income and Product Accounts Tables, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, tbl.l.l.5 (last revised Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cf
m?ReqID=9&Step=l#reqid=98Step=l&isuri-l (Select 'Table 1.1.5 Gross Domestic Produc';
then "modify'; select "Quarterly"; use range "2005-A&Q" to "2013-A&Q"; click "refresh table')
(providing a gross residential investment change of $519.6 billion between the First Quarter of
2006 and Second Quarter of 2009 and a gross nonresidential investment change of $398 billion
from the First Quarter of 2008 to the Fourth Quarter of 2009).
50 S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST.
LOUIS (updated Aug. 25, 2015, 10:31 AM), https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/SPCS
20RSA.
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The stock market, of course, fell by more than 50%. 51 Add in
significant growth in the national debt, a dramatic decline in
household income, and increased income inequality, and the
human and financial toll of the Global Financial Crisis begins to
come into focus.
Responding aggressively from the onset of the crisis, the FOMC
cut the target for the federal funds rate ten times over a period of
fourteen months-including a series of dramatic three-quarter
point reductions. 52 By December 2008, thus, its target range had
53
already been reduced to essentially zero.
Contrary to expectations, however, the market did not respond.
Notwithstanding the rate reduction's easing of bank access to
credit-and the corollary decline in the return that could be
earned on cash reserves-bank lending remained exceedingly
tight, with certain credit markets locked up entirely. 54 Companies
with cash on hand similarly resisted investment, or any move to
increase hiring. 55
Unemployment consequently remained
stubbornly elevated, and growth was stuck in low gear, even after
the recession formally ended and the economy began to grow in
June 2009.56
For the Federal Reserve Board, this combination of events
presented an essentially unprecedented dilemma. In traditional

51 Graph: S&P 500, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LouIs, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred
2/graph/?id=SP500 (use date range: "Oct. 31, 2005" to "Sept. 16, 2015 ' ) (last visited Nov. 2,

2015).
52 See Open Market Operations:Intended Federal Funds Rate, Change (basispoints) and
Level, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS. (updated Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.federal
reserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm (reporting changes of three-quarters of a point
in January, March, and December of 2008).
5? Id.; Yellen, supra note 1, at 9.
5 The commercial paper market dried up over the course of 2007 and 2008. See generally
Marcin Kacpercyzk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial PaperDuring

the FinancialCrisis of 2007-2009, 24 J. ECON. PERSPS. 29 (2010) (explaining the effect of
economic downturn on commercial paper).
55 See Tom McGinty & Cari Tuna, Jittery Companies Stash Cash, WALL ST. J. (updated
Nov. 3, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.comarticles/SB125712903877521763 (noting the
cash-hoarding tendency of large companies during the recession).
66 See Peter Yeoh, The Dilemmas of Compensation Policies and Practices, 31 BuS. L. REV.
56, 56 (2010) (describing the factors that burdened economic recovery in the United States
following the financial crisis).
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central bank practice, both in the United States and elsewhere,
the central bank's primary, if not exclusive, tool of monetary policy
is short-term interest rate adjustments.5 7 By reducing the rate at
which depository institutions trade Federal Reserve-held fund
balances among themselves during an economic downturn, the Fed
can encourage banks to increase lending and companies to invest
and hire-with resulting positive impacts on economic growth and
58
employment.
With the short-term rate at or near the "zero bound," however,
that sole tool ceased to be available. 59 Negative interest rates were
an option in theory, of course. 60 In the real world of monetary
policymaking, however, the Federal Reserve Board's arsenal was
empty-with growth below a sustainable level and unemployment
well above normal levels. 61 Faced with that dilemma, the Board of
Governors determined to chart a new course, embracing a pair of
at impacting (even if
new tools of monetary policy, both directed
62
only indirectly) long-term interest rates.
The first, which received far more public attention, was the
Fed's program of "quantitative easing."63 In essence, by buying up
and holding Treasury and mortgage bonds, quantitative easing
allows the Fed to increase liquidity, and thereby drive down
interest rates. 64 Equally important, by reducing the supply of debt
on the market, quantitative easing also reduces the term and risk

57 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 9 (calling the lowering of the Fed funds rate the "traditional
tool for expansionary monetary policy").
at 4 (explaining how the Fed Funds rate is used to influence and encourage
58 Id.
economic growth).
59 Id. at 9.
60 See N. Gregory Mankiw, Maybe the Fed Should Go Negative, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
2009, at B47 (detailing a theory of negative interest rates).
61 See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
62 Beyond the two major policy innovations noted above, the Fed also briefly engaged in

what is sometimes known as "Operation Twist"-an attempt to alter interest rates by
extending the maturity of relevant debt. Plosser, supra note 44, at 348-49.
63 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1,
10-11 (2014) (detailing the effect of quantitative easing).
64 See Federico Lupo-Pasini & Ross P. Buckley, Global Systemic Risk and International
Regulatory Coordination:Squaring Sovereignty and Financial Stability, 30 AM. U. INYL L.
REV. 665, 710 (2015).
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premiums associated with it, with similar effects on interest
65
rates.
Although the program of quantitative easing was controversial
in the eyes of many, most retrospective accounts have found it an
effective means to increase economic growth and to lower longterm interest rates. 66 Over three rounds of quantitative easing,
the Federal Reserve Board's purchase of nearly $4 trillion in debt 67
coincided with a shift in the United States GDP from a negative
growth rate of around -8% at the start of the first round in late
2008, to a still modest, but substantially improved, positive growth
rate of around 2.2%, when the third round was suspended six
years later. 68 Needless to say, that shift did not arise solely-or
perhaps even primarily-from the Fed's policy of quantitative
easing. But the latter would at least appear to have helped.
As grave as the impact of the financial crisis was, however, the
Fed did not limit its policy innovations to quantitative easing
alone. 69 It also embraced a second, less widely discussed tool to
impact long-term rates. 70 Beyond its earlier efforts to increase the
clarity of its communications, the Global Financial Crisis drove the
Fed to embrace communication as "an independent and effective
tool for influencing the economy." 71 In the brave new world of
post-crisis monetary policy, thus, "explanation is the policy."72

65 See Brett W. Fawley & Luciana Juvenal, Quantitative Easing:Lessons We've Learned,
THE REG'L ECONOMIST, July 2012, available at https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regi
onal-economist/july-2012/quantitative-easing-lessons-weve-learned.
66 See WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 10-11 (examining the economic effects of the Fed's
asset purchase programs).
67 Jeff Kearns, Fed's $4 Trillion Holdings to Boost Growth Beyond End of QE, BLOOMBERG
(updated Oct. 24, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 4-10-24/fed-s-tr
illion-holdings-keep-boosting-growth-beyond-end-of-age.
68 United States GDP Growth Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.
comlunited-statesgdp-growth (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (using a range of Jan. 1, 2008 to Oct.
31, 2015).
69 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 10 (explaining "unconventional" methods of monetary
policymaking implemented by the Fed).
70

Id.

71 Id. at 9.
72 Id. (emphasis in original).
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III. COMMUNICATION AS CENTRAL BANK POLICY

At least in part, long-term interest rates reflect market
expectations about where short-term rates will stand over the life
of any given debt instrument. Stating it differently, long-term
rates can be understood to represent an aggregation of the shortterm rates in place over the relevant period of time. 73 Enhanced
insight into where short-term rates are likely to go over time
74
might therefore be expected to indirectly impact long-term rates.
By offering such insight, central bank communications can
75
function as a tool in shaping long-term interest rates.
The use of communication as a tool to alter interest rates is not
without its challenges. These begin with issues of credibility. On
the front end, it will not always be easy for a central bank to
establish the necessary credibility to support a change in market
expectations about future rates-especially where the use of
communication in that fashion is a new practice, or market
76
conditions are characterized by significant uncertainty.
Sustaining such credibility once it is achieved may also be
challenging, especially in the face of a shifting market.7 7 The very
need to maintain credibility bears its own risks, however,
including potential over-resistance to deviating from prior

73 Clemens J.M. Kool & Daniel L. Thornton, How Effective is Central Bank Forward
Guidance? 2-5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-063A, 2012),
https://www.research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-063.pdf (describing Woodford's account of
optimal policy inertia where short-term rates are related to long-term rates); see also
Woodford, supranote 12, at 3 (describing effect of long-term predictions on interest rates).
74 Cf. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, The Timing of Central Bank Communication
7 (European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 565, 2005), available at https://www.ecb.europ
a.eulpub/pd/scpwps/ecbwp565.pd?f5Od520fl9dc2a99ccacO4fecd32d4b6.
75 It follows that communication may serve as an effective substitute for reduced shortterm rates when the latter have reached the zero bound. Jeffrey R. Campbell et al.,
Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance 1, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2012, available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/projects/bpea/
spring-2012/2012a-evans.pcdf.
76 See Suoninen, supra note 14 (noting some concern that unpredictability could
undermine the goals of monetary policymaking by boxing regulators into a box of their own
making).
77 See id.
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commitments, even in the face of changed circumstances.7 8 The
79
desire to maintain credibility thus may trump good policy.
As much care as effective Fedspeak required, meanwhile, the
use of communication to shape long-term market expectations
Even with such care, however, the
demands even more.80
psychological complexities against which such motivated
communication plays out may limit its potential for success.8 1 Part
of the issue may be the possibility of excess communication.
Consider the market's wild gyrations in response to Fed Chair Ben
Bernanke's testimony before Congress on May 22, 2013: As
Bernanke delivered his prepared testimony, the stock market rose
to the highest level it had ever reached.8 2 As he continued
speaking during the ensuing questions and answers, however, the
market quickly changed its mind, reversing direction, and
ultimately falling well below its opening level.8 3 Even beyond the
possibility of excess communication, though, the impact of
communication on market participants' expectations is simply
difficult to predict. As a consequence, it will not always be an
effective tool of monetary policy.
Finally, there is the risk that the market may come to over-rely
on Fed communications. One might thus expect some reduction in
private information acquisition, in the face of increased Fed
communication.8 4 Herding behavior may increase, in turn, given
the heightened focal quality of Fed communications as a source of
information. Over-reaction to Fed policy announcements might
85
follow as a result.

78 See id. (noting that regulators may be "boxed in" by their prior attempts at forward
guidance).
79 See Kool & Thornton, supra note 73, at 5-6 (providing an overview of pro's and con's of
forward guidance, including a form of path dependency as a disadvantage).
80 See id. at 24 (noting limited predictability suggested by studies of long-term predictions).
81 See Anatole Kaletsky, The Many Interpretations of Ben Bernanke, REUTERS (May 23,
2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/23/us-kaletsky-bernanke-idUSBRE9
4MOUQ20130523#RTmJM4Ogq8Q4sDH9.97 (reporting that investors could be prone to
"transference" or "conscious projection" when reacting to policymaker communications).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Kool & Thornton, supranote 73, at 5.
95 Id.
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Notwithstanding these challenges, numerous central banks
embraced communication as part of their arsenal of monetary
86
Most
policy tools well ahead of the Federal Reserve Board.
notable among these was the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Beginning in 1997, New Zealand's central bank adopted a practice
of announcing the expected path of the three-month bank bill
rate.8 7 With time, that practice evolved into the bank's issuance of
"Policy Assessments" every six weeks, offering so-called "forward
88
guidance" as to the bank's projected path for the bank bill rate.
To a greater or lesser degree, other central banks also came to
rely on communication as a tool in moving interest rates, even
prior to the Global Financial Crisis. The Norges Bank and the
Riksbank-the
central banks of Norway
and Sweden,
respectively-followed New Zealand's lead in 2005 and 2007.89 In
the former case, forward guidance as to three key rates came to be
offered three times per year, with projections extended out for
three years beyond the relevant calendar year.9 0 The Riksbank
followed suit, but with guidance only as to its daily rate of
interest. 9 1
Looking to those and other precedents, the Federal Reserve
Board embraced a number of significant new communications
strategies, in response to the financial crisis. Most generally, in
January 2012, the FOMC drafted and published what it described
as a "Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy
Strategy." 92
Succinct as that one-page distillation was, it

86 See id. at 3 (including the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank, Riksbank, and
the Czech National Bank among banks which adopted forward guidance).
87 Id.

88 See Douglas R. Holmes, Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks, 47 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 15, 28, 59 (2014) (describing New Zealand's use of public communications in
monetary policy).
89 Kool & Thornton, supra note 73, at 3.
90 Id.

at 10.
91 Id. at 10-11.
92 FEDERAL
OPEN

MARKET

COMMITTEE,

STATEMENT

ON

LONGER-RUN

GOALS

AND

MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY (2012, amended 2015), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/monetarypolicy/filesJFOMCjLongerRunGoals.pdf [hereinafter FED. STATEMENT]; see also
Yellen, supra note 1, at 11-12 (commenting on the Fed's publication of its long-term policy
statement).
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represented an important strategy shift for the FOMC. As
described by then-Board member Janet Yellen, the Statement
"laid out, for the first time, the rates of inflation and
unemployment that the FOMC considers consistent with the dual
mandate. ' 93 In doing so, she suggested, the Statement could be
expected "to remain a valuable roadmap for many years to come,
indicating how monetary policy will respond to changes in
94
economic conditions."
On an ongoing basis, meanwhile, the FOMC's post-meeting
statements fully embraced the approach of forward guidance.
Starting with the statement following its December 2008 meeting,
each FOMC statement has included some articulation of the
expected path for short-term interest rates, going beyond the
immediately following meeting. 95 That articulation, however, is
far from a simple exercise.
Generally speaking, forward guidance can be keyed either to
some numeric threshold or to some future point in time. In the
former case, the bank commits to hold rates steady unless either
(1) inflation rises above a certain level or (2) the unemployment
rate falls below a certain level. 96 In keying forward guidance to a
future time, by contrast, monetary authorities commit themselves
to hold rates constant at least until some point in the future-be it
a precise date ("explicit" forward guidance) or some undefined
97
point in the future ("implicit" guidance).

93

Yellen, supra note 1, at 12.

94 Id.
95 Kool & Thornton, supra note 73, at 19-20.

Beginning with its August 2011 postmeeting statement, the FOMC shifted from an open-ended reference to maintaining rates
near zero for "some time" (i.e., "implicit" forward guidance) to referencing specific future
dates (i.e., "explicit" guidance). Id.
-6 See Yellen, supranote 1, at 13 (noting the Fed's use of quantitative thresholds for both
inflation and unemployment).
97 See Kool & Thornton, supra note 73 (describing forward guidance policies that are
implicit, using an undefined period, or explicit, setting a defined period during which
policies will be sustained).
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98
The FOMC has taken both approaches in its forward guidance.
Beginning in December 2012 the FOMC embraced a "statecontingent approach," with defined thresholds for inflation and
unemployment. 99 Yet an indication of timing remained in the
guidance as well. The time frame was stated alongside a "reaction
function," however, which was expected to allow the market to
develop its own conclusions as to future Fed action. 10 0 Wellwarranted as such a mixed approach may have been, it also
generated some significant degree of uncertainty.101
Finally, the frequency, speed, and regularity of Fed press
conferences were also increased. 10 2 Their clarity was likewise
In these various ways, the Fed embraced
enhanced.
communication as a central tool of United States monetary
policymaking in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

IV. REGULATORY DIMENSIONS OF CENTRAL BANK COMMUNICATION

As the Federal Reserve Board has come to utilize
communication as a tool of monetary policymaking-in parallel
with other relevant tools, including changes in short-term interest
rates and debt purchases, how might we think about the
The Fed's
regulatory implications of such communication?
communications cannot be dismissed as mere words. To the
contrary, they are designed to alter market behavior no less than
any other (more direct, more affirmative, or more concrete) tool of
monetary policy.

98 Jay G. Stirling, Note, How to Deal with Hornets: The Administrative ProcedureAct and
the Social Cost of Carbon, 100 IowA L. REV. 853, 869-70 (2015) (explaining history of Fed
forward guidance).
9 Plosser, supranote 44, at 349 n.2.
100 Yellen, supra note 1, at 13.
101 Cf. Kool & Thornton, supra note 73, at 3-5 (providing an overview of criticisms of
central bank communication). Another variable in the construction of central bank forward
guidance-including for the Fed-is whether the guidance should address not only the path
of interest rates, but also any program of quantitative easing. See Yellen, supra note 1, at
10 ("It is important to emphasize that the effects of asset purchases also depend on
expectations.").
102 See Plosser, supra note 44, at 353 (noting the Fed's implementation of post-meeting
press conferences).
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The Federal Reserve Board, of course, is an administrative
It is subject, as such, to the demands of the
agency.103
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 10 4 and the strictures of due
process more broadly-its independence notwithstanding. To be
sure, judicial review of the Fed's regulatory activity has been
10 6
highly deferential. 105 But it has not been non-existent.
Might we imagine some framework of regulatory disciplinesome minimal procedural requirement, some provision for narrow
review, or some other regulatory constraint-that ought to be
applied to Fed communications? From the vantage of "agency
action" as commonly understood, the answer would arguably be
no. More specifically, any treatment of Fed communication as
"regulatory" in nature might be resisted on three counts. 10 7
To begin, one might question whether the FOMC's various
The
constitute agency action at all.
communications
Administrative Procedure Act offers a fairly broad definition of

103 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fed
eralreserve.gov/faqs/about_12799.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 2015).
104 Pub. L. No. 404, 79 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.). The APA defines an agency as "each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency," thus including
the Federal Reserve. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012).
105 See Zaring, supra note 45, at 175 ("[T]he Fed's supervisory rules do get reversed
occasionally, [but] the FOMC's decisions have generally been exempted from judicial review
entirely." (internal citations omitted)).
106 See, e.g., Bd. of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 443 (1947) (reviewing a decision of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to remove the director of a national bank
under the Banking Act of 1933).
1o7The analysis above focuses on potential objections to the review of Fed communicationand, more specifically, communications of the Federal Open Market Committee-as a species
of agency action. More generally, one might question whether any monetary policy decisionregardless of whether it is implemented by way of direct action or through "mere"
communication-should be subject to judicial review. No less an observer than Augustus
Hand found the possibility of such review to be deeply problematic. See Raichlie v. Fed.
Reserve Bank, 34 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1929) ("[I]t would be an unthinkable burden upon any
banking system if its open market sales and discount rates were to be subject to judicial
Given my ultimate interest in the reviewability of administrative agency
review.").
communications generally, see infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text, I leave that
question aside. I would question, however, the argument that the primarily "economic" rather
than "legal" effects of the Fed's monetary policy decisions justify their insulation from review.
The impact of many agency actions may be primarily economic in nature-in ways very much
analogous to the impact of the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policymaking.
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"agency action." It "includes the whole or a part of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof,
or failure to act."108 Acts of omission are thus covered no less than
acts of commission. It is not limited to formal acts. Finally, it
explicitly encompasses conduct that is the functional equivalent of
its enumerated categories of agency action. Perhaps as a result,
there has been relatively little jurisprudence directed to whether
any given agency conduct rises to the level of "agency action."
Instead, the fact of such action would almost seem to speak for
itself.
But can agency conduct constitute action where the agency is
doing nothing more than speaking? Even under a forgiving
standard, an agency is arguably not acting when its speech is an
end unto itself. One might even cast agency action and mere
speech as counterpoints, as in the familiar expression: "All talk
and no action." 10 9
Even if Fed communications do constitute agency action, a
second objection might question whether they are final agency
action of the sort subject to judicial review and correction. 110 In
order for agency action to qualify for review, it must represent "the
consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process."'' In that
way, we can be assured that the agency has been given ample
opportunity to reach a legally permissible conclusion-including,
112
as appropriate, by revision of any preliminary action or decision.
1085 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012) (defining "agency action").
109 The law of criminal conspiracy suggests a similar juxtaposition between talk and
action, with mere talk protected, and criminal liability ordinarily dependent on fellow
conspirators taking at least one "overt act" in furtherance of the conspiracy. Cf. Kevin Jon
Heller, Note, Whatever Happened to Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Of Drug
Conspiracies, Overt Acts, and United States v. Shabani, 49 STAN. L. REV. ill, ill (1996)
(arguing that Supreme Court's decision to eschew the "overt act" requirement from drug
conspiracy cases was incorrect).
110 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) ("[Flinal agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.").
111Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 156 (1997) (citing Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948). Final agency action is also "an action from
which legal consequences will flow."' Id. (quoting Port of Bos. Marien Terminal Ass'n v.
Rederiaktiebo Llaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
112 See, e.g., Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 761 F.3d 383, 387-90 (5th Cir. 2014)
(finding final agency action where the agency has expressed its "official position," and where
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We can also avoid, in this way, the unnecessary use of scarce
113
judicial resources.
Further, even if FOMC communication can be understood as a
form of agency action, it would seem-by its very nature-to be
Once offered, Fed
subject to amendment and adjustment.
statements can be limited, supplemented, amended, or even
abandoned. In a sense, that is precisely their point, across each of
the FOMC's rate-setting meetings. FOMC communications are
never, as such, truly final.
Finally, even if they can fairly be construed as agency action
and as final agency action, it is not apparent that Fed
communications can be understood as binding in any fashion that
would warrant application of the strictures of administrative
law. 114 The FOMC's various and sundry post-meeting statements,
minutes, policy statements, and other communications clearly
15
seem to lack the "force of law."
Courts have recognized that the requirement that agency action
have legal force cannot be applied in too rigid a fashion, lest it
function as a loophole for agencies to avoid the demands of
administrative review. 116 Agency action has thus been found to
have binding effect, based on how it is understood and applied by
the relevant agency-rather than its formal characterization.
Perhaps more relevant for present purposes, agency action has

no more administrative review of the agency's position was available (quoting Fairbanks N.
Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 543 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2008))).
113 See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that premature
judicial review of agency action "squanders judicial resources since the challenging party still
enjoys an opportunity to convince the agency to change its mind").
114 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 156 (noting that final agency action must result in some legal
consequence).
115 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979) ("It has been established in a
variety of contexts that properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the
'force and effect of law.' "); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things
Americans Can't Figure Out About ControllingAdministrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5,
23 (2009) (finding a lack of clarity from the Supreme Court on what constitutes "force of
law" in the context of judicial deference to regulatory action).
116 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-54 (1967), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
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sometimes been deemed effectively binding, based on private
parties' experience of it.117
Even from the latter perspective, though, it is difficult to find
anything in the nature of a legal constraint in the FOMC's
communications. They are directed to no one in particular. Nor do
they prescribe any specific line of action (or even inaction).
Notwithstanding its limitations, perhaps we should not be too
quick to abandon the notion that Federal Reserve Board
communications have a certain regulatory quality to them.
Regardless of whether they constitute regulation properly defined,
Fed communications may generate something of the consequence
of such regulation. 118 That may be true, in fact, even with
reference to each of the three key metrics just reviewed. A
consideration of what might be thought of as the nature, the
function, and the impact of Fed communications in the face of the
financial crisis thus suggests a potentially more nuanced
evaluation of such communication as agency action, as final, and
as binding.
A. THE NATURE OF THE FED'S CHANGES IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

With the potential exception of its 2012 policy statement, the
FOMC's post-meeting statements, meeting minutes, press
conferences, and other communications do not naturally fall within
the scope of our traditional conceptions of agency action. When we
step back to consider both the internally- and externally-oriented
nature of the changes that the Fed made in its communications
strategy during the financial crisis, however, the question is
arguably a closer one.
Internally, the FOMC's changes might be said to represent
some regularization of its decisionmaking processes-and perhaps
117 See Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Richard Murphy, Finality, 4 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 12:20 (3d
ed. 2015) (noting that agency and party have different experiences with finality depending
on their perspectives); see also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) ("If an agency... leads private parties or State permitting authorities to believe
that it will declare permits invalid unless they comply [with the putatively final document],
then the agency's document is for all practical purposes 'binding.' ").
118 See supranotes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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of its patterns of behavior more generally. This is perhaps most
evident in the aforementioned Statement on Longer-Run Goals
and Monetary Policy Strategy.
Rather than leaving future
policymaking entirely up to the FOMC's exercise of discretion at
any given meeting, the Statement seeks to define the terms of
FOMC decisionmaking in the future.
The
Statement might thus be understood to shift
decisionmaking from the open-ended exercise of Fed discretion in
supporting the economy to something more regularized and
defined. Both full employment and moderated inflation are
enumerated as relevant goals. 119 A commitment is made to adopt
a balanced approach to their pursuit. 120 And the distinct time
horizons for achieving an appropriate level of each are
acknowledged. 121 Perhaps most notably, for the first time a
specific numeric target is set for inflation-and a numeric range
suggested for unemployment-bringing yet further regularization
to future FOMC deliberations and decisionmaking. 22
The FOMC's more detailed (and farther-reaching) post-meeting
statements are to similar effect. While nominally speaking only to
its current views and expectations regarding rate-setting decisions
at subsequent meetings, 23 those statements can be analogized to
the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy
in their introduction of greater regularity and consistency in the
FOMC's internal planning and decisionmaking.
The external nature of the Fed's changed approach to
communications is simply the corollary of the latter. With
increased internal regularity, the external predictability of Fed
119 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 12 ("[The] statement laid out, for the first time, the rates of
inflation and unemployment that the FOMC considers consistent with the [FOMC's] dual
mandate.").
120 Id.
121 Id. (noting the long-term strategy of monetary policymaking and emphasizing gradual
nature of the change).
122 See FED. STATEMENT, supra note 92 (setting goal for inflation at 2% and
unemployment between 5.2% and 5.5%). The FOMC further states its intention to "reaffirm
[the] principles" contained in the Fed. Statement-with appropriate adjustments-at its
organizational meeting each January. Id.
123 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 2-4 (commenting on the Fed's practice of providing postmeeting statements, which provide insight into FOMC policy decisions).
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action necessarily grows as well. From an external perspective,
though, the nature of the Fed's changes in communication strategy
also represent something more than improved predictability.
First, the Fed's more robust communication entails an
enhanced degree of notice-giving about FOMC decisionmaking. At
the most obvious level, FOMC communications give notice of its
near-term policy intentions. 124 But even beyond the intentions of
which they give explicit notice, FOMC communications allow Fed
watchers to evaluate the prospects for FOMC action more
Drawing on the decisionmaking criteria and
generally.
benchmarks identified by the FOMC, observers can construct a
kind of "reaction function" 125-with consequently greater notice as
to the Fed's likely decisionmaking than prior to the financial
126
crisis.
More concretely, the increased notice-giving inherent in the
Fed's post-crisis communications policy can be seen in the altered
timing for the release of FOMC minutes and other information.
With the more timely release of such information-and, more
particularly, its release in advance of (rather than after) the
following meeting-such communications truly give notice in a
way that they previously did not, and could not. 127
Beyond increased notice, the changed nature of Fed
communication from an external perspective turns on the
increased reason-giving in the FOMC's communications. By more
openly evaluating relevant factors, and how they cut for or against
Fed action today and in the future, the FOMC has significantly
124 The Fed's policy statements, such as its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary
Policy Strategy, are inherently based on factors that are certain only at the moment in time
in which they are considered, even though the statement "reflects the [FOMC's] longer-run
goals, its midterm outlook, and its assessment of risks.., that could impede the attainment
of [its] goals." FED. STATEMENT, supra note 92.
125 Yellen, supra note 1, at 13.
126 See id. at 4-9 (describing evolution of communications from "never explain" to growing

transparency).
supra note
127 See generally Yellen,

1 (giving

general

background of increased

communication and transparency); see also Meeting Calendars, Statements, and Minutes
(2010-2016), BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.

gov/omnetarypolicy/Formccalendars.htm (last updated Sept. 17, 2015) (listing meetings and
release dates prior to those meetings).
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enhanced the quality (or at least the visibility) of its reasoned
8
decisionmaking.12
The nature of the Fed's post-crisis communications strategy,
then, reflects increased regularity in the FOMC's internal
deliberations. Further, it is characterized by a greater degree of
both explicit and implicit notice to the market, in terms of future
Fed action. Finally, it reflects a heightened emphasis on reasongiving in FOMC decisionmaking.
As is obvious to even the most casual student of administrative law,
the foregoing represent just the features-both internal and
external-that the statutory and jurisprudential regime of
administrative law generally demands from administrative
agencies, in support of their relevant actions. When agencies
engage in rulemaking, thus, we expect them to give adequate
notice of their intended action. 129 Further, they must offer a
"concise general statement of [the] basis and purpose" of the
proposed rule. 130 Finally, their decision must be grounded in
"reasoned decisionmaking," and be supported by a "reasoned
analysis."13'
To be clear, my point is not that the Federal Reserve's shift
toward behavior more characteristic of traditional agency action
necessarily renders it so. Even if I talk like a duck, I may not be a
duck. The FOMC's significant strides in the direction of procedural
regularity, notice, and reasoned decisionmaking, on the other hand,
may offer grounds for identifying a certain regulatory quality in its
communications policy. An account of Fed communications as a
species of agency action becomes even more plausible, however,
when we consider the function and impact of that communication.

128 FED. STATEMENT, supra note 92. See also Yellen, supra note 1, at 3 (stating "my
colleagues and I continue to spend many hours laboring over the few hundred words in this
statement, which are then extensively analyzed only minutes after their release").
129 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012) (providing notice requirements for rules, which are to
be published in the Federal Register).
130 Id. § 553(c).
131 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 52 (1983).
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B. THE FUNCTION OF FED COMMUNICATIONS

Beyond the ways in which the nature of the Fed's post-crisis
communication policy gives its pronouncements something more of
the quality of agency action, the function of Fed communication
holds further implications for their regulatory quality. More
the function of FOMC
precisely, when we appreciate
policy, the question of
of
monetary
communications as a tool
whether they might constitute final agency action becomes a closer
call.
At the most basic level, FOMC communications might be
understood as simply an exercise in information-giving. Through
its statements, minutes, press conferences, and the like, the Fed
provides the market with information that it would not otherwise
Properly understood, however, the function of Fed
have.
communications goes well beyond the dissemination of non-public
information.
The operative function of FOMC communications is to change
behavior. 13 2 It does not seek such change, moreover, merely in the
commonplace sense of informing future action by market
to change the
participants. Rather, FOMC communications seek 133
participants.
market
relevant
of
immediate behavior
Recall the model of Fed communication outlined above. In
articulating its expectations as to future adjustments (or the lack
thereof) in short-term rates, the FOMC aims to shift the long-term
rates that are an aggregation of the short-term rates expected to
be in place over the relevant long-term. 3 4 By shaping market
expectations as to the likely path of short-term rates, thus, the
FOMC is able to move expectations as to long-term rates. 135 That,
in turn, alters investment and purchase decisions both directly
and indirectly.
For an example of central bank communication's impact on market behavior, see
BLINDER ET AL., supra note 15, at 9.
13 See, e.g., id. (noting the positive effects of Chairman Bernanke's correction of his
"misreported" statement on the markets).
134 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
135 See Yellen, supra note 1, at 6 ("What is important is the public's expectation of how the
FOMC will use the funds rate to influence economic conditions over the next few years.").
132
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At heart, this model is an exercise in coordination. In contrast
with settings in which the interests of relevant market
participants are fundamentally misaligned, the dynamic here is
that of a coordination game, in which players' best interests are
achieved by the proper alignment of their choices and behaviors. 136
The operative challenge, as a result, is a matter of setting
expectations. 137
Given limits on communication-be they
structural or simply a result of the number of relevant playershow can the expectations of each player be coordinated around a
common (and mutually beneficial) strategy?
Long-term interest rates are determined in some significant
part, then, by the expectations of the collected universe of market
participants (or at least a market-moving subset of that universe).
Those expectations can be shaped, however, by Fed
communications. 138 More specifically, by providing a focal point for
long-term rates at a particular level, FOMC communications may
serve to coordinate market expectations around that result-and

139
thereby achieve it.

What is critical for present purposes is that Fed
communications about the future are not, in this account, about
the future. To the contrary, they are about market participant
behavior today. In fact, one might state the point even more
strongly: Beyond concerns of diminished credibility, 140 if the
FOMC's communications have effectively served their function,
there is no need for it to actually follow through on its expressed
intentions. Rather, the work that its communications are meant
136 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77
S. CAL. L. REV. 215, 234-36 (2004) (explaining the dynamics of coordination). See generally
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000)
(arguing that the expressive use of law may help solve coordination problems).
137 Ahdieh, supranote 136, at 230-32.
138 See Woodford, supra note 12, at 4 ("Better information on the part of market
participants about central-bank actions and intentions should increase the degree to which
central-bank policy decisions can actually affect these expectations, and so increase the
effectiveness of monetary stabilization policy.").
139 See Blinder et al., supra note 9 ("[Mlanaging expectations is a central part of monetary
policy...."); Holmes, supra note 88, at 24, 28 (describing the use of central banks
communication to influence expectations and to influence others to affect change indirectly).
140 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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to do will already be done-regardless of what it ultimately does or
141
does not do.
This peculiarity of the function of Fed communication brings us
back to the question of whether such communication might
constitute final agency action. In some significant sense, the
FOMC's communications truly are final. Their work is done the
moment they are issued. As a formal matter, of course, they are
subject to future agency deliberation, re-evaluation, modification,
action, or inaction. In reality, however, none of that is true. The
interest rate path the FOMC has promised may or may not
That is inconsequential as to its
ultimately be followed.
communications, however, as the work of the latter is done-and
final.
C. THE IMPACT OF FED COMMUNICATIONS

As suggested above, there can be little question that Fed
communications are not formally binding on market participants.
It is true, as David Zaring points out, that they represent
directives to the New York Federal Reserve Bank's open market
operations desk. 142 Beyond that narrow mandate, however, they
prescribe no conduct whatsoever. In a sense, it is difficult even to
identify whom they might bind-or to what standard of conduct.
On the other hand, there can be little question that Fed
communications impact the behavior of private market
participants in significant ways. 143 Given the decisive influence of
both short-term and long-term interest rates on lending,
investment, purchase, and cash-holding decisions, the Fed's
communication of target rate decisions should be understood to
have a significant impact on private conduct.
Beyond any such direct effect of interest rate decisions,
moreover, the dynamic of coordination can also be understood to
Cf. Woodford, supra note 12, at 4 ("Insofar as the significance of current developments
for future policy are clear to the private sector, markets can to a large extent 'do the central
bank's work for it'....").
142 See Zaring, supra note 45, at 160 (noting that open market orders are implemented by
"traders who staff New York Fed's open market operations desk").
143 Cf. supra Part IV.B.
141
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have relevance here. To the extent individual market participants'
decisions to lend, to invest, to make purchases, and to accumulate
cash earnings are intertwined with the parallel decisions of their
peers, the effective constraint generated by Fed communications
may be significant.
As to many questions, the decisionmaking of any given market
participant is independent of that of other market participants.
Institutions and individuals may elect an array of distinct choices,
even in the face of uniform market conditions. As to many crucial
financial decisions, on the other hand, the optimal strategy may be
a coordinated one. 144 While some embrace a counter-cyclical
approach to investment, 145 the very existence of a cycle suggests
some norm of alignment. The return on an investment often will
be linked, thus, to the volume of investment generally. 46 The
same might be said of the choice between investment and savings,
with accrued cash likely to hold less appeal as market investment
is growing-and vice-versa. 147 The choice among alternative
trading systems-or market platforms more generally-also
exhibits something of this coordination dynamic. 48
Where a dynamic of coordination is at work in market
participants' decisionmaking, Fed communications that move longterm interest rates can be understood to have a relatively stronger
coercive quality to them. Given the focal quality of FOMC
statements on the direction of interest rates, the Fed's capacity to
move the market is significant. Once it intervenes in that fashion,
in turn, the coordination dynamic at work ensures that the
lending, investment, and other decisions of any given market
participant are pressed (or pulled) in that direction as well. It

144 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: CoordinationFunctions of the Regulators
State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 587 (2010) ("[B]anks can be expected to coordinate around
either a strategy of lending funds or of withholding them.").
145 Cf. Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Contrarian Investment,
Extrapolation,and Risk, 49 J. FIN. 1541 (1994) (exploring utility of contrarian investing).
146 See Ahdieh, supra note 144, at 587-88 (explaining the role of coordination in
maintaining market stability).
147 See id. ("[D]epending on relevant expectations, hedge funds and private equity investors
will coordinate around a policy of investment or noninvestment (or even divestment).').
148 See id. at 588 n.40 (offering other accounts of coordination in financial markets).
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would be wrong to say they are bound to go in that direction. But
149
the degree of compulsion should not be underestimated.
Perhaps also relevant to the question of the binding effect of
Fed communications are the intentions that stand behind them.
As described above, FOMC communications are designed to move
the market in precisely the ways that private market participants
feel themselves pressed. 15 0 An intent to bind is not sufficient to
render Fed communications legally binding, of course. That the
Fed's communications are designed for that purpose, on the other
hand, helps support a conception of them as having some binding
effect.
To be clear, my claim is not that Fed communications are
binding in any formal or legal sense. But we do well to attend to
their potential to impact market participants in ways functionally
equivalent to such binding constraint. That may not warrant
treatment of the Fed's communications as identical to agency
action as conventionally understood. It may, however, favor the
extension of some regulatory review to such communication.

What are the implications of the foregoing? As we have seen,
the Fed's post-crisis embrace of communication as a tool of
monetary policy exhibits both internal and external qualities akin
to conventional agency action. Further, those communications are
final in ways that resonate with the APA's requirements for
judicial review of agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 704. Finally,
they create something of a binding effect on market participants,
however lacking they are in formal legal force. Even so, it remains
unclear where Fed communications might fit within the current
strictures of administrative law jurisprudence.

149 But'see Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852, 861 (4th
Cir. 2002) ("I]f we were to adopt the position that agency actions producing only pressures
on third parties were reviewable under the APA, then almost any agency policy or
publication issued by the government would be subject to judicial review.").
150See supranotes 132-39 and accompanying text.
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Most plausibly, Fed communications might be evaluated as a
species of so-called "guidance document." 151 Review of such
documents is authorized when they rise to the level of "final
agency action."'152 The assessment of finality, in turn, revolves
around the nature of any such document as (1) the
" 'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking process," rather
than a "merely tentative or interlocutory" pronouncement, and (2)
conduct "by which 'rights or obligations have been determined,' or
from which 'legal consequences will flow.' "153
As discussed above, there is a plausible argument to be made
that Fed communications meet the requirements of each of these
prongs. They are the consummation of the relevant process in that
they are the product of internal agency deliberation and
decisionmaking, and they have a significant impact on the
external market. 154 They exhibit something of a binding effect on
55
market participants, despite their formal lack of legal force.
And, such private market experience of an agency decision, as
noted above, has been acknowledged as one basis for ruling that a
given agency action has the "force of law." 156 Especially given the
Supreme Court's encouragement of a "pragmatic" and "flexible"
approach to the question of finality157-one oriented to the
"practical results of an agency's action"-an account of the Fed's
15,The Administrative Procedure Act thus exempts from the requirements of notice-andcomment rulemaking both "interpretative rules" and "general statements of policy"-more
commonly referenced under the broader headings of nonlegislative rules or guidance
documents. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012); see also David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules,
Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 286 (2010) (stating.
that nonlegislative rules are exempt from notice and comment).
152 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
153 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
154 See supra Parts IV.B-C.
155 See Koch & Murphy, supra note 117, § 12:20 ("Notwithstanding any formal appeal of
this argument, courts have sometimes determined that a nonlegislative rule is final and
subject to review based, among other factors, on its practical consequences for regulated
parties.").
156 See Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of Agency Guidance Documents: Rethinking
the Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 383-84 (2008) (commenting on the Bennett
test, under which an agency's nonlegislative documents could be subject to review because
of the expectations of the agency and parties as to the document's binding force); see also
supra note 117 and accompanying text.
157 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1967).
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communications as a species of guidance document and as final
agency action is at least plausible.
With the potential exception of the Statement on Longer-Run
Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, on the other hand, the Fed's
communications do not fall squarely within the range of guidance
documents and nonlegislative rules that courts have been willing
to subject to administrative review. 16 8 They are not "policy"
statements designed for the ages, but speak only to a distinctly
delimited period of time. They are not binding on either the
And however great their
agency or market participant.
consequences may be, their impact is not distinctly legal in nature.
My argument, as such, is at once narrower and broader than a
claim that Fed communications should be subject to the existing
strictures on agency action. It is narrower, in that I do not suggest
that Fed communication meet the requirements for judicial review
My
within the current framework of administrative law.
argument is broader, on the other hand, in that I believe the case
of Fed communication may require us to rethink the scope of those
current constraints. If the Federal Reserve Board is engaged in
conduct that is internally and externally akin to other agency
action, is engaged in such conduct not only for the purpose of
altering private market participant behavior, but with an eye to
doing so immediately, and is having just that impact, we should
not be too quick to excuse its conduct from at least some degree of
oversight.
The proper scope of any such oversight-falling somewhere
between complete insulation from review and the full scope of
"hard look" review159-is beyond the purview of this brief Article.
There can be little question that such review would entail serious

See supranotes 151-53.
159See Louis J. Virelli III, DeconstructingArbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 721, 727-28 (2014) (defining "hard look" review as a "'searching and careful' process
by which a court reviews an agency's policymaking process to ensure that it does not exceed
the proper bounds of administrative discretion" (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-17 (1971), abrogated in part by Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977))).
158
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This begins with the need to determine its
difficulties. 160
appropriate boundaries. Clearly not all agency communication
warrants review. 161 Only some subset of communications-which
emerge from some process of agency deliberation, are designed to
exert some immediate effect, and are fairly consequential in that
regard-would be proper targets for review.' 62 Yet drawing the
line as to each of those criteria is far from easy. Add to that other
potential variables, including whether it is the perspective of the
relevant agency or the recipients of the given communication that
is the appropriate focus, and the line-drawing exercise becomes
163
even more challenging.
The independent status of the Federal Reserve Board
As a matter of
introduces a further layer of complexity.
institutional design, is the appropriate forum for any evaluation of
Fed communications the courts, the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs or elsewhere in the Office of Management and
Budget or the Executive Office of the President, or somewhere else
entirely? Especially given the foregoing discussion, one might also
wonder whether any review directed to Fed communications
64
should be conceived as a procedural or substantive evaluation.
Is the Fed merely obliged to engage in certain procedures in its use
of communication as a policy tool? Or could we imagine (with
obvious difficulty) some substantive appraisal of the "reasoned
analysis"'1 5 behind the Fed's policy choice?
In the final analysis, though, such complexities should not
distract us from the fundamental features of the Federal Reserve
Board's decision to embrace communication as a tool no less
forceful and effective in impacting private market behavior than

160 See, e.g., id. at 737 (noting the Supreme Court's difficulty in developing a unified
theory of judicial review of agency action).
161 Cf. Zaring, supra note 45, at 175 (noting that the bounds of institutional competencies
warrant deferential judicial review).
162 See supra Part IV.C.
163 See supra notes 117, 156 and accompanying text.
164 See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of

Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2011) (proposing an alternative mode of judicial
review of agency nonlegislative rules).
165 See supranote 128 and accompanying text.
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its traditional, more affirmative interventions. 166 If such explicit
agency action is deserving of some review and constraint, the
complete insulation of Fed communications from review becomes
difficult to defend. 167 And perhaps ultimately, difficult to sustain.
V. CONCLUSION
It is not, I will be the first to confess, easy to process the notion
of mere communication as agency action. It is even more difficult
to wrap one's mind around the idea that an agency's
communications might be subject to judicial review. With an eye
to the Federal Reserve Board's post-financial crisis embrace of
communication as. one of its key tools in shaping United States
monetary policy, however, this Article suggests the need at least to
consider the possibility.
But the argument for engaging that possibility ultimately goes
beyond the case of Fed communications. Important characteristics
of the dynamic at work in Fed communications operate in other
areas as well. In areas characterized by coordination, by network
externalities, or by a strong orientation to standard-setting,
governmental communications-and other interventions with no
apparent regulatory force-may have an impact no less than that
of coercive regulation. 168 From Internet standard-setting to the
avoidance of financial panics, and from file format interoperability
to the facilitation of optimal innovation, communication may serve
an important regulatory function, and warrant our attention and
evaluation as such. 169
Exploration of these and analogous settings lies well beyond
this brief Article's attempt to suggest the possibility of an
expanded conception of agency action. These examples help to
emphasize, however, the need to reconsider our traditional notions
See supra Part III.
1 fully appreciate, as acknowledged above, that some would resist review of any Fed
action in pursuit of its monetary policy mandate. See supra note 107.
168 See supra notes 132-37.
169 The argument for greater judicial review of agency communications may be even
greater outside the context of the Federal Reserve Board, given separate arguments for the
insulation of monetary policy from judicial review. See supranote 107.
166
167
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of the scope of agency action subject to judicial review and
constraint. In the growing number of areas in which the dynamics
of coordination are strong, in which network externalities play a
significant role, or in which standard-setting is essential, critical
agency interventions may take the form of mere communication.
For all its potential impact, such communication may warrant our
close attention.

